

TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF STATE

IRAN CHRONOLOGY I

(5/85 - 10/31/86)

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05/30/85 Ambassador to Israel SAMUEL LEWIS reports that MICHAEL LEDEEN is in Israel talking to Israeli officials to obtain intelligence about Iran, without notice to the U.S. Embassy.

06/03/85 McFarlane reports to GPS, who is in Lisbon, on meeting with RABIN; does not mention LEDEEN visit to Israel.

06/05/85 GPS cables MCFARLANE objecting to LEDEEN visit to Israel, to an intelligence relationship with Israel concerning Iran, and to bypass of State and Embassy.

06/07/85 MCFARLANE cables response to GPS insisting that LEDEEN had been in Israel "on his own hook," and that MCFARLANE was "turning it off entirely."

06/17/85 MCFARLANE circulates draft NSDD proposing change in U.S. policy toward Iran, including the "provision of selected military equipment as determined on a case-by-case basis."

06/29/85 GPS submits comments to MCFARLANE on the draft NSDD, opposing the proposal regarding arms transfers and stating "I cannot agree that the NSDD as drafted should be signed by the President."

07/14/85 MCFARLANE cables GPS discussing Israeli contacts with Iranians and Israeli/Iranian interest in U.S.-Iranian dialogue, commencing with Israeli delivery of TOWS and Iranian attempts to release hostages. MCFARLANE offers analysis, favors U.S. expressing interest.

07/14/85 GPS cables MCFARLANE proposing "positive but passive reply," involving U.S. willingness to listen to Iranians, without commitment, on opening a dialogue and reinforcing MCFARLANE's expressed cautions against being drawn into arms transfers. GPS tells McFarlane to manage the issue personally and inform Israeli emissary that GPS and MCFARLANE are "in close contact and full agreement every step of the way."



07/16/85 GPS sees intelligence report calling GHORBANIFAR a "talented fabricator."

07/19/85 GPS visits the PRESIDENT in the hospital upon return from ASEAN meeting. MCFARLANE present. No discussion of the proposed Iran initiative.

07/24/85 GPS is reminded by his Executive Assistant, CHARLES HILL, to ask MCFARLANE for a status report on Iran proposal.

08/06/85 At GPS' regularly scheduled meeting with the PRESIDENT, MCFARLANE states that three meetings between Israel and the Iranians have occurred, and that MCFARLANE'S contact is DAVID KIMCHE. The Iranians want a dialogue with the United States, want arms from the U.S. and 100 TOWS from Israel, in exchange for four hostages. MCFARLANE says that the deal will be "totally deniable," and that he is pursuing the contact. GPS argues that any policy of selling arms to Iran or loosening arms flow restrictions is wrong, and could not be kept deniable or secret.

09/04/85 GPS learns that NORTH is expecting seven hostages to be released on a beach near Tripoli.

09/13/85 MCFARLANE tells GPS that the Israel/Iran dealings are "not moving."

09/17/85 U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon BARTHOLOMEW tells HILL that WEIR said he was released to bring pressure for release of Dawa prisoners. BARTHOLOMEW states that he knows "precious little about origins of this or who is involved." Lunch meeting among GPS, CASEY, MCFARLANE, and WEINBERGER. MCFARLANE debriefs group on hostages, noting that the hostage release is "not going anywhere."

11/18/85 At the Geneva Summit, MCFARLANE tells GPS that four hostages will be released in a few days, and that Israel is sending an airplane to a European city with 100 HAWKS, which will be shipped to Iran if the hostages are released. MCFARLANE says he has cleared this with the PRESIDENT. GPS objects, both to the plan and to being notified too late to be able to stop it.

11/22/85 GPS is advised by OAKLEY of information from various sources that the hostages will be released for 120 HAWKS at \$250,000 apiece. GPS learns also that the proposed release date has slipped in order to get flight clearance from a European country.

11/23/85 GPS learns that no hostages have been released and the deal has therefore collapsed. He tells HILL: "It's over."

12/05/85 POINDEXTER calls GPS to inform him of a White House meeting on 12/7 because Iran initiative had reached a decision point. Later, GPS tells POINDEXTER that he is "basically uninformed [about the proposed Iran initiative], although BUD told me about it at the start and I said no." GPS asks about congressional notification, says that the U.S. is breaking with its hostage policy, and states that "this thing has got to be stopped." GPS also tells POINDEXTER that he is upset that State has been cut out of cable traffic.

12/06/85 GPS meets with ARMACOST and PLATT to prepare for White House meeting on Iran initiative the following day. GPS learns from POINDEXTER that HAWK shipment was sent even though no hostages were released, but that it "misfired" because Iran rejected the shipment as "too old."

12/07/85 Meeting at White House. GPS, WEINBERGER, and DONALD REGAN argue against arms for Iran. WEINBERGER expresses view that it is illegal. MCFARLANE, POINDEXTER, and the PRESIDENT speak in favor of the policy. The PRESIDENT supports going ahead, emphasizing importance of obtaining release of the hostages.

POINDEXTER proposes that MCFARLANE tell Iranians that, if they release hostages without any arms, the U.S. will then work towards a better relationship. If MCFARLANE is turned down, he would be authorized to ask Britain to "pick up the sale." GPS objects to the latter aspect of POINDEXTER's proposal, says this would be the same misguided policy. Meeting concludes with decision that MCFARLANE meet Iranians to seek hostage release without arms dimension. In aside after the meeting, POINDEXTER tells GPS that the deal had fallen apart around Thanksgiving, and he advised the PRESIDENT to disengage, but the PRESIDENT said no.

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12/10/85 --GPS (in London) is informed by staff that
Iranians have rejected MCFARLANE approach and
that at a White House meeting that morning, the
Iran initiative had been turned off. NORTH
reportedly had prepared a paper stating the
hostages would die as a result.

12/11/85 ARMACOST cables GPS that MCFARLANE has
recommended dropping the entire enterprise, but
the PRESIDENT wants all other avenues
"energetically pursued."

01/04/86 POINDEXTER advises GPS that AMIRAN NIR had come
to see him to revive the hostage deal. NIR
presented a proposal involving the release of
certain Hizbollah prisoners, and the sale of
3,000 TOWs to Iran, in exchange for the
hostages. GPS states that this suffers from all
the same problems as the previous proposals,
calling it a "payment" for hostages. GPS thinks
POINDEXTER is negative toward proposal.

01/07/86 Meeting at the White House among PRESIDENT, VICE
PRESIDENT, WEINBERGER, MEESE, CASEY, REGAN,
POINDEXTER, and GPS. GPS and WEINBERGER argue
strongly against the Iran proposal, but everyone
else favors going forward.

01/16/86 GPS attends a Cabinet meeting at the White House,
from 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. but is not present at
5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. discussion of the Iran
initiative.

01/17/86 GPS attends "Family Group Lunch" at the White
House at which Iran initiative is discussed. GPS
argues that the policy is both "unwise and
illegal."

02/28/86 GPS has long talk with POINDEXTER concerning the
hostage situation. POINDEXTER tells GPS that
hostages will be released the following week.
Nothing is said about any arms transactions.
POINDEXTER advises that the Iranians want a
higher level meeting, and the White House has
picked MCFARLANE. GPS recommends that MCFARLANE
be given written instructions. GPS is
subsequently shown the Terms of Reference for
MCFARLANE's mission which are consistent with GPS
views. GPS approves Terms of Reference. (Terms
of Reference, used by MCFARLANE in May 1986,,
speak of arms sales as only a future prospect.)

03/11/86 POINDEXTER informs GPS that MCFARLANE objected to going ahead with the meeting and that the initiative is "all off" again.

04/21/86 POINDEXTER tells GPS that the Iranians have complained, and the PRESIDENT said they could "take it or leave it." GPS asks if this means that PRESIDENT is prepared to "leave it," and POINDEXTER says, "I think so."

05/03/86 ARMACOST cables GPS in Tokyo that Ambassador PRICE in London has learned from a staff member that TINY ROWLANDS was approached by NIR to take part in arms transactions with Iran which had White House approval and which involved GHORBANIFAR and KHASHOGGI. POINDEXTER was allegedly the point man and the State Department was cut out.

05/04/86 GPS advises DONALD REGAN of PRICE/ROWLANDS contact. He expresses his opposition to dealing with persons mentioned in ARMACOST cable, and argues that if a low level official such as the Embassy staffer knows about this it will become public and leave the PRESIDENT exposed. GPS says REGAN must go to PRESIDENT and get him to "cut your losses and call it off." REGAN expresses alarm and agrees to talk to the PRESIDENT.

GPS alerts POINDEXTER to the PRICE/ROWLANDS contact and makes the same points as with REGAN. POINDEXTER states that he told PRICE there was only a "smidgen of reality" to the allegations and tells GPS "we are not dealing with these people." GPS voices his strong objections to any such proposed transaction. POINDEXTER says he does not share GPS' view. GPS argues that the PRESIDENT is very exposed.

05/28/86 OAKLEY tells PLATT that the NORTH operation has "fizzled," negotiations have broken down, and that MCFARLANE was involved and may have been in Tehran. PLATT advises HILL, who informs GPS.

Late May or Early June 86 After GPS returns from trip to Philippines, he is told by both POINDEXTER and CASEY that the Iran-hostage operation has ended and the people associated with it have been told to "stand down."

06/12/86 GPS advises PLATT that he told Attorney General MEESE that, while the United States is prosecuting Israelis for arms sales to Iran, Israel could point a finger back at the United States. MEESE was "not deterred" by GPS' comments.

07/02/86 ARMACOST writes GPS concerning renewed conjecture about arms sales to Iran; he argues against the policy.

09/16/86 LEDEEN asks HILL to arrange a meeting with GPS to discuss the Iran matter. HILL takes no action.

10/21/86 LEDEEN calls HILL again about meeting with GPS. He states that a "grand strategy" involving a strategic relationship with Iran had gone off track with regard to hostages.

10/26/86 HILL advises LEDEEN that GPS will not see him.

10/31/86 POINDEXTER advises GPS that release of DAVID JACOBSEN is imminent.